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We’re going to examine the ways in which the means and manner of executive compensation have
contributed to a reckless culture and quarter-by-quarter mentality that in turn have wrought havoc
in our financial system. Remarks by President Barack Obama on Executive Compensation with
Secretary Geithner. September 4, 2009 (Obama, 2009).
There is a widespread view (illustrated by the above quote) that bankers’ compensation was responsible
for creating the incentives to take on risk that led to the latest financial crisis. This view of executive
compensation has guided numerous proposals to regulate pay at financial institutions.1 Moreover, the
perception that executive compensation created excessive risk-taking incentives has often been accompanied
by the belief that those incentives were the consequence of corporate governance failures, which created a
misalignment between executives’ incentives and shareholder interests.2
However, despite the attention devoted to executive pay by regulators, extant research does not provide
much support for the hypothesis that CEO compensation in the run-up to the crisis is responsible for the
high levels of risk of some financial institutions. Notably, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find no significant
relation between the most commonly used measure of the risk-taking incentives generated by executive
compensation (Guay, 1999’s option vega) and bank performance during the crisis.3 Cheng et al. (2014)
also put forth an alternative explanation of the relation between CEO compensation and bank risk, in
which banks’ exogenously given riskiness determines the (optimal) CEO compensation, and not the other
way around, and find results consistent with their proposed explanation. Moreover, Fahlenbrach and Stulz
(2011) find that firms whose CEOs had their incentives better aligned with shareholders’ interests had
worse performance during the crisis, and Cheng et al. (2014) report that firms whose CEOs were less likely
to be entrenched were riskier. Therefore, the authors of both papers conclude that the misalignment of
the incentives of shareholders and managers of financial institutions is unlikely to have contributed to the
financial crisis.
In this paper, we re-examine the question as to whether the incentives to take on risk created by CEO
compensation are associated with bank risk and investigate whether the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs
are aligned with those of shareholders.
1Section 956 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act requires that the banking agencies regulate compensation arrangements at large
financial institutions to discourage inappropriate risk taking, and, in 2011, the agencies proposed a rule to regulate pay in
financial institutions. Outside of the US, regulatory action has been intense as well. The Committee of European Banking
Supervisors issued in 2010 a set of Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices, and the European Union approved
directives CRD III (in 2010) and CRD IV (in 2013) to regulate compensation at financial institutions (see Murphy, 2013, for a
description and a critical assessment of these reforms). In the UK, the Financial Services Authority issued in 2009, and amended
in 2010, the so called Remuneration Code. At the multinational level, the Financial Stability Forum issued the Principles for
Sound Compensation Practices in 2009.
2For example, in 2009, SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro stated: “I believe that many of the problems leading to our economic
crisis can be laid at the door of poor corporate governance. Too many boards failed in their primary function of diligently
overseeing management. As a result, too many managers took on too much risk and made decisions that were too focused on
the short-term.” (Schapiro, 2009)
3We note, however, that Gande and Kalpathy (2011) report that that same measure computed prior to the crisis is positively
associated with the amount of Federal assistance during the crisis.
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Regarding the first question, we consider the absence of a relation between CEO risk-taking incentives
and bank risk somewhat puzzling. As economists, we expect individuals, including CEOs, to respond to
incentives. Moreover, it seems likely that the CEOs of large complex financial institutions had ample room
to alter their firms’ riskiness in response to those incentives. Thus, we propose and test the hypothesis that
the solution to this apparent puzzle is that standard measures of the risk-taking incentives generated by
executive compensation, which focus solely on the incentives generated by stock options, do not capture a
potentially large component of the incentives to take on risk for bank CEOs, namely the incentives generated
by their stock holdings (an argument also made by Chesney et al., 2012). Indeed, because of limited liability,
equity holders have the incentive to shift risk to debtholders and other claim holders (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Galai and Masulis, 1976), and this incentive is especially strong for the equity holders of highly levered
firms, such as large US financial institutions. Now, the incentives to take on risk embedded in stock holdings
will have a small impact on a CEO’s risk-taking incentives if the CEO owns few shares or, more generally, if
his wealth responds little to changes in the stock value. Therefore, we propose a measure of the incentives
to take on risk generated by equity, levered delta (LD), which we define as the product of leverage and the
CEO’s exposure to the firm’s equity value (delta). This measure captures in the simplest way possible the
hypotheses that risk-taking incentives will be increasing in leverage and that the impact of leverage on CEO
risk-taking incentives will be greater the greater the CEO’s exposure to the firm’s equity value.
In addition to the incentives generated by stock and option holdings, other components of executive
compensation arrangements can also generate risk-taking incentives, which are not captured by standard
incentive measures. For example, termination payments, which reduce the downside risk for CEOs, may
increase CEOs’ incentives to take on risk. In the opposite direction, executives’ holdings of debt-like claims,
such as unsecured pension benefits or deferred compensation, may reduce risk-taking incentives by aligning
CEOs’ incentives with those of debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). Thus, we
also consider these other measures of CEOs’ risk-taking incentives.
We also study the relation between shareholders and CEOs’ risk-taking incentives and bank risk. The
results by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Cheng et al. (2014) that riskier financial institutions are charac-
terized by a better alignment between the interests of shareholders and managers suggest, on the one hand,
that corporate governance failures are unlikely to be responsible for high levels of risk taking and, on the
other hand, that bank shareholders have strong incentives to induce executives to take on risk. Following
up on these results, we investigate whether corporate governance failures can explain our measure of CEO
risk-taking incentives (LD) or whether, to the contrary, the strength of CEOs’ risk-taking incentives responds
to the strength of shareholders’ risk-taking incentives, as measured by bank leverage. Standard arguments
suggest that shareholders’ incentives to take on risk at the expense of other claim holders will be increasing
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in firm leverage and, therefore, that the shareholders of more levered firms will give their CEOs stronger
risk-taking incentives. However, if shareholders ultimately bear the cost of this risk shifting in the form of
a higher cost of debt, the shareholders of more levered firms may structure executive compensation so as
to limit risk shifting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; John and John, 1993). In such case, there need not be a
positive relation between leverage and risk-taking incentives.
To investigate the relation between CEO risk-taking incentives prior to the financial crisis and bank risk,
we use bank failure during the crisis period (2007–2010) as the measure of bank risk. We measure risk ex
post to capture the tail risk that is unlikely to be captured by standard risk measures, such as stock return
volatility, systematic risk, or idiosyncratic risk, if they are computed prior to the crisis (as in Cheng et al.,
2014 or DeYoung et al., 2013). Moreover, measures that infer bank risk from the market value of securities
(such as the buy-and-hold returns employed by Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011) capture the part of firm risk
that is borne by the holders of those securities, but may not incorporate the risks borne by other stakeholders,
such as the taxpayers who bail out a bank’s security holders. To partly address this limitation, we use an
encompassing definition of bank failure during the 2007-2010 financial crisis that includes not only bank
closures but also acquisitions of distressed banks with the intervention of supervisors. As a case in point,
Bear Stearns did not default, yet it was acquired by J.P. Morgan, with the intervention and assistance of the
Federal Reserve, for $10 per share, when the previous closing price had been $30, and when just two weeks
earlier the stock had traded at $85.88. Our measure considers Bear Stearns as a failed financial institution.
We estimate the relation between risk-taking incentives measured in year 2006 and bank failure in the
period 2007-2010 for a sample of large US financial institutions and find that, whereas there is no significant
relation between bank failure and risk-taking incentives measured as option vega (in line with the findings
of Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011), there is a statistically and economically significant relation between LD
and bank failure. At the same time, if we control for LD, no other measure of incentives (such as the size of
termination payments or the manager’s holdings of inside debt) is significantly associated with bank failure.
Therefore, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the incentives generated by CEOs’ holdings
of stock and options had an impact on bank risk. However, we do not have an exogenous source of variation in
compensation incentives that would allow us to identify the causal effect of these incentives on risk. Therefore,
our results could well reflect the fact that it is optimal for riskier firms to give their CEOs compensation
contracts with larger LD or be due to the correlation of LD with omitted variables related to risk or risk-
taking incentives. Although we cannot rule out these possibilities, we consider different omitted variables
that could be driving the results and include proxies for these variables as controls in our regressions. Thus,
we consider that the relation between LD and bank failure is due to the correlation of our incentive measure
with the strength of other unmeasured incentives (such as those stemming from the threat of replacement
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or career concerns) or with firm or CEO characteristics potentially correlated with greater risk taking. The
relation between risk-taking incentives, as measured by LD, and bank failure survives the inclusion of these
controls. We also find no support for the alternative explanations that our incentive measure is simply
measuring risk and not risk-taking incentives, or that bank failure captures persistently poor performance
instead of risk. Finally, we also check that our results are robust to changes in the definition of the sample, the
criteria we use to identify bank failure, different specifications, alternative risk measures, and an alternative
measure of risk-taking incentives provided by Chesney et al. (2012).
We find no significant relation between standard measures of the alignment between the incentives of
managers and shareholders, such as board size or independence, Gompers et al. (2003)’s Governance index,
or Bebchuk et al. (2009)’s Entrenchment index, and either bank failure or risk-taking incentives, in line with
the results of Cheng et al. (2014) and Chesney et al. (2012). However, if we use banks’ lagged leverage as a
measure of shareholders’ incentives to shift risk to debtholders (as in John et al., 2010), we find that it has
a positive relation with LD. Moreover, in contrast to the results by John et al. (2010), we find no evidence
in our sample that the shareholders of more levered firms structured the compensation of their CEOs so as
to achieve a lower pay-performance sensitivity. Therefore, our results do not lend support to the hypothesis
that improving shareholders’ ability to monitor and discipline managers would have substantially reduced
bank risk. If anything, our results suggest that a better alignment between CEO incentives and shareholder
interests would have resulted in stronger risk-taking incentives in the more levered financial institutions.
In addition to the work by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Cheng et al. (2014), several articles have
analyzed the relation between CEO compensation and bank risk in the wake of the financial crisis. In the
paper most closely related to ours, Chesney et al. (2012) propose a measure of the sensitivity of the value
of CEOs’ equity holdings to the volatility of the firm’s assets (asset volatility vega) derived from a model in
which equity is a call option on the firm’s assets and stock options are an option on that option.4 Chesney
et al. (2012) find evidence generally consistent with a positive relation between asset volatility vega in the
years prior to the crisis and bank write-downs (which they use as an ex post measure of risk) during the crisis.
As a robustness check, we compute asset volatility vega for the firms in our sample and find that it is very
highly correlated with LD. Moreover, using asset volatility vega as a measure of risk-taking incentives leads
to results very similar to those obtained with LD. DeYoung et al. (2013) analyze the relation between both
risk and business policies likely to be related to bank risk and one-year lagged CEO incentives (measured
by delta and option vega). In contrast to Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), DeYoung et al. (2013) do find a
relation between option vega and both bank risk and bank policies for a sample of U.S. commercial banks,
4Anderson and Core (2013) propose alternative measures of risk-taking incentives that aim to capture the incentives embed-
ded in stock, options, and debt-like claims held by CEOs.
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but they measure risk prior to the financial crisis. Gande and Kalpathy (2011) show that option vega before
the crisis is positively associated with the amount of U.S. Federal Reserve emergency loans provided to
banks, which they use as an ex post measure of bank risk. Bhagat and Bolton (2014) examine the net payoff
obtained by the CEOs of 14 of the largest US financial institutions during the period from 2000 to 2008, as
well as CEOs’ trades of their own stock during the same period, and conclude that CEO compensation in
those firms generated incentives for excessive risk taking. John et al. (2010) study the relation between the
pay-performance sensitivity of bank CEOs, leverage, and several measures of outside monitoring and find
that pay-performance sensitivity is positively associated with outside monitoring and negatively associated
with bank leverage. Finally, Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) and Bebchuk et al. (2010) analyze case studies
of executive compensation at large U.S. financial institutions and propose compensation reforms.5
Our article contributes to the literature analyzing executive compensation and risk taking in banks in
three ways. First, we propose a simple measure of CEO risk-taking incentives that captures the incentives
generated by CEOs’ portfolios of both stock and stock options, and we show that this measure is positively
associated with bank risk. Second, we use an ex post measure of bank risk, bank failure during the crisis, that
aims to capture the full extent of bank risk taking prior to the crisis. And thirdly, we find that shareholder
incentives to take on risk are positively related to CEO risk-taking incentives.
1 Sample selection
We select all firms with 4-digit SIC codes between 6000 and 6300 covered by the compensation database
Execucomp in year 2006. Of the 167 firms so selected, we keep all firms with SIC codes 6020 (Commercial
Banks), 6035 (Savings Institutions, Federally Chartered), and 6036 (Savings Institutions, Not Federally
Chartered)—a total of 114 firms—and we exclude firms with SIC codes 6111 (Federal Credit Agencies) and
6282 (Investment Advice). To determine the inclusion of the 41 firms in the remaining SIC codes, we search
the National Information Center of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) to
verify each firm’s institution type in year 2006.6 We keep a firm in the sample if it is identified as any type
of regulated institution.7 We also keep in the sample those firms listed as primary dealers by the New York
Fed.8 This process yields a base sample of 130 firms in 2006, from which we drop five firms because there
5There are few earlier studies of the relation between CEO compensation and bank risk taking, notably Houston and James
(1995) and John and Qian (2003). Laeven and Levine (2009) and Erkens et al. (2012) also analyze the relation between bank
governance and bank risk for international samples of large financial institutions.
6These firms have SIC codes: 6099 (Functions Rel. To Dep. Bkg.), 6141 (Personal Credit Institutions), 6153 (Short-Term
Business Credit), 6159 (Misc. Business Credit Instn.), 6162 (Mortgage Bankers & Loan Corr.), 6172 (Finance Lessors),
6199 (Finance Services), 6200 (Security & Commodity Brokers), 6211 (Security Brokers & Dealers). We access the National
Information Center of the FFIEC at http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/SearchForm.aspx.
7The classes of regulated institutions are: financial holding company, bank holding company, savings and loans holding
company, federal savings bank, national bank, state member bank, FDIC-insured non-member bank, federal savings association.
8http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2006/an060915p.html
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is not enough information to compute LD.9 Therefore, our final sample has 125 firms. For transparency, we
report our final sample in Appendix B.10 In Section 8, we also check the robustness of our results to different
sample selection criteria.
Since we obtain compensation data from Execucomp, our sample is composed of relatively large, publicly
traded financial institutions. The sample contains all large bank and financial holding companies whose
main activity is commercial banking, which range from holding companies with national presence (such as
Bank of America or Wells Fargo) to regional bank holding companies (Fifth Third Bancorp., National City
Corp. or Regions Financial Corp.), or companies operating mainly in one or two states (such as Anchor
Bancorp Wisconsin Inc. or Tompkins Financial Corp.). The sample also contains the five largest investment
banks (Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley) and several
holding companies (such as American Express Co. and Charles Schwab) that have bank subsidiaries and are
federally regulated.11
We obtain accounting information from Compustat Fundamentals and market data from CRSP. Panel
A in Table 1 displays summary statistics for the firms in our sample, whereas Panel B displays the same
statistics for the universe of firms in Compustat with SIC codes between 6000 and 6050. The financial
institutions in our sample are significantly larger, irrespectively of whether size is measured by market
capitalization or total assets: The average market capitalization in year 2006 is $15.7 billion (median $2
billion) and the average total asset value is $103.8 billion (median $11.5 billion) for the firms in our sample,
whereas the same values in the Compustat universe of banks are $4.4 billion (median $0.2 billion) and $41.4
billion (median $1 billion), respectively. Average leverage is lower and average ROA higher in our sample
than in the Compustat universe of banks.
2 Risk and bank failure
Our measure of risk taking in the years preceding the crisis is bank failure during the crisis period. To date
the crisis, we follow the time-lines provided by the New York Fed (which dates the beginning of the “financial
turmoil” in June 2007, when Bear Stearns pledged $3.2 billion to aid one of its hedge funds)12 and the Saint
Louis Fed (which dates the beginning of the financial crisis in February 2007, coinciding with Freddie Mac’s
announcement that it would no longer buy the riskiest subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities)13
9We drop Center Financial Corp., with SIC 6036, because it does not match with Compustat Fundamentals. We drop
Raymond James Financial Corp., Bankunited Financial Corp., Glacier Bancorp Inc., and Guaranty Financial Group Inc.
because there is not enough information to compute our measures of risk-taking incentives.
10Our sample selection procedure is analogous to the one employed by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), except that we exclude
Federal Credit Agencies. Thus, for example, Fannie Mae is not in our sample.
11Although we often refer to the firms in our sample as banks, they are really holding companies with bank subsidiaries.
12http://www.ny.frb.org/research/global_economy/Crisis_Timeline.pdf.
13http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline.
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and define 2007 to be the first year of the financial crisis.
Because of the potentially systemic importance of many of the banks in our sample, regulators may
be expected to intervene to bail out a bank at risk of insolvency or to encourage sound banks to acquire
financially distressed banks so as to avoid actual default. Identifying bank failure with default would, thus,
not capture the instances of financial distress in which the regulators’ intervention averts bank failure. Even
in the midst of a financial crisis, outright default of large financial institutions is too rare to allow for a
precise estimation of the coefficients of interest. Moreover, using default as a measure of failure could bias
the estimates if different banks have different probabilities of being bailed out. In particular, the CEOs
of those banks more likely to be bailed out may take on greater risk in the anticipation of a bailout. If
regulators would not allow these banks to default, one would incorrectly attribute a low level of risk taking
to banks with a large risk exposure. Therefore, we define bank failure so as to encompass both institutions
that default and those that are acquired by other financial institutions with the support or intervention of
regulators.
More precisely, we first identify which firms are delisted in the period 2007-2010 by analyzing the series
of monthly returns in the CRSP stock database. This process yields a set of 31 delisted firms. However,
firms may delist for reasons other than bankruptcy or financial distress. For example, firms may go private,
merge, or be acquired for strategic reasons even if they are sound. To determine whether firms were delisted
because of financial distress, we take the following steps:
1. We check the FDIC webpage for information about banks that become inactive during the crisis
period.14 However, the FDIC provides information about active and inactive banks but not holding
companies (which are our unit of observation). Therefore, we first identify the main banking subsidiary
of each holding company from the organization’s structure provided by the FFIEC. The FDIC indicates
if a bank is inactive because it was put into receivership, or because it was merged (with or without
financial assistance by the regulator). If the FDIC indicates that the firm was closed or there was a
merger with financial assistance by the Fed or the FDIC we consider the firm failed. We unambiguously
identify 9 firms as failed in this step.
2. Merger discount. Following the procedure used by Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we use the SDC Platinum
database to identify mergers and check whether firms not classified as failed in the previous steps
are acquired with a discount in the crisis period. In particular, we identify three firms acquired with
significant discounts (with one-day, one-week and one-month negative premiums of above 30%). We
also consider as failed a firm (Mellon) acquired with a one-day small discount of 6%, as well as a
14http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp.
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firm (Countrywide) that is acquired with a one-day positive premium of 40%, but with one-week and
one-month discounts of 18% and 28%, respectively.
3. For those delisted firms that we do not classify as failed in the previous steps, we search the PROQUEST
database using the company name and the following keywords: failed, bankrupt, intervened, closed.
The PROQUEST search identifies one firm as failed (Lehman Brothers, which is identified from its
Chapter 11 petition filing).
4. We finally perform the same search on the internet (using standard search engines). This broader
internet search indicates that one firm is acquired with substantial regulatory pressure (Merrill Lynch),
another one with TARP aid given to the acquiring institution (National City Corp), and another one
after a large amount of TARP bailout money is given to the target institution (Provident Bankshares).15
The procedure identifies 19 firms in the sample as failed. For transparency, we provide the list of failed
firms as well as the reason why they are identified as such in Appendix C. Since the last three steps involve
some judgment on our part, in Section 8 we consider the robustness of our results to alternative classifications
of the firms identified as failed in these steps.
As discussed in the introduction, using bank failure as a measure of risk helps us avoid some limitations
of alternative risk measures. However, bank failure is not without problems. First, as an ex post measure
of realized risk, bank failure contains a significant amount of measurement error: Whether a bank fails is
determined not only by ex ante decisions that determine the level of risk, but also by luck. This measurement
error will push up the standard error of our estimates. Second, our measure of bank risk captures the exposure
to risks that have negative realizations during the financial crisis. It is possible that those banks more likely
to fail conditionally on the events that led to the financial crisis were not riskier ex ante. Third, with our
definition of failure we capture instances in which a firm’s financial condition is so weak that it is forced
to disappear as an independent entity (either because of bankruptcy or forced merger). However, we may
consider as healthy systemically important financial institutions that managed to survive only thanks to
massive public aid (such as Citigroup or Bank of America). Since this misclassification may bias our results,
in Section 8 we evaluate the robustness of the results to classifying as failed (or excluding from the sample)
some institutions that survived as separate entities only because they receive extremely large amounts of
15In the case of Merrill Lynch, there were sustained rumors that the Federal Reserve had pressured Bank of America to carry
out the acquisition and Congressional hearings were held in 2009 to determine, among other things, whether the Government
or the Federal Reserve had pressured or threatened Bank of America’s management to acquire Merrill Lynch (see, e.g., Story
and Becker, 2009). National City Corp was acquired after being one of the few qualified banks that was denied TARP help. On
the contrary, the acquirer (PNC) received TARP money a few weeks before the purchase of National City was announced, a
move that was widely interpreted as a push by supervisors to force National City to agree to be acquired (see, e.g., Fitzpatrick
et al., 2008). Finally, Provident Bankshares Corp. received $151 million from TARP to prop up capital on Nov. 14, 2008. One
month later, M&T and Provident Bankshares Corp. announced that the former would acquire the latter for $401 million.
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public funding. Finally, as a binary variable, our measure is coarse, since it makes no distinctions within
the groups of failed or surviving banks. In Section 8 we also evaluate the relation between bank failure and
other risk measures and check the robustness of our results to the use of alternative risk measures.
3 Risk-taking incentives from stock and option holdings
Compensation will create incentives to take on risk if increasing risk increases the expected utility of the
CEO’s compensation. Since the CEOs in our sample hold large portfolios of stock and stock options, their
risk-taking incentives will be largely determined by how risk influences the expected utility of those portfolios.
Executive stock options are call options on the firm’s stock. Because of the convexity of the relation
between the value of the underlying stock and the payoff from exercising the option, a basic result in asset
pricing is that the value of a call option is increasing in the volatility of the underlying. Because of this
result, (Guay, 1999) proposed to use the option vega of an executive’s wealth as the measure of the executive’s
risk-taking incentives. Option vega approximates the change in the CEO’s wealth that would follow from a
0.01 change in the volatility of stock returns. If the CEO holds ni options of option grant i (where different
option grants differ in their strike price and maturity), the CEO’s option vega is:
option vega =
∑
i
ni
∂Oi
∂σS
× 0.01, (1)
where Oi is the Black-Scholes value (often adjusted for dividends) of option i and σS the volatility of stock
returns. Since Guay (1999)’s contribution, most papers analyzing CEOs’ risk-taking incentives measure
these incentives by means of option vega (e.g., Knopf et al., 2002; Coles et al., 2006; Brockman et al., 2010;
Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011).
However, this measure of risk-taking incentives does not account for the incentives to take on risk gener-
ated by executives’ stock holdings. Indeed, a long line of work in corporate finance, starting with Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Galai and Masulis (1976), has highlighted that leverage creates incentives for sharehold-
ers to take on risk. This is so because any increase in firm value above the amount owed to debtholders is
fully appropriated by shareholders, so shareholders’ gains from upside risk are not capped. At the same time,
limited liability implies that shareholders’ losses are limited to their initial investment. In fact, the payoff to
a shareholder of a levered firm is similar to the payoff of a call option on the firm’s assets with a strike price
equal to the face value of the firm’s debt (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973). Thus, standard valuation
models imply that the value of the equity of a levered firm is increasing in the volatility of the firm’s asset
value (the underlying asset). Moreover, these models also yield the result that the sensitivity of the value of
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an in-the-money call option increases as the option gets closer to the money (that is, as the strike price and
the value of the underlying get closer). For the case of equity, this means that the sensitivity of equity value
to asset volatility increases as the value of the firm’s assets and the face value of debt get closer, or, in other
words, as leverage increases. Figure 1 illustrates this point. For a firm with low leverage (whose equity is
deep in the money), such as firm A, the mean-preserving spread depicted in the Figure does not change the
expected equity payoff. However, for a highly levered firm, such as firm B, the same mean-preserving spread
increases the payoff to equity holders if asset returns are high, but does not reduce the payoff if returns are
low, thereby increasing equity holders’ expected payoff. Thus, whereas the risk-taking incentives stemming
from equity may be low for firms with low leverage, they may be substantial for highly levered firms, such
as large US financial institutions.16 Because shareholders’ incentives to take on risk are increasing in the
firm’s leverage, we use leverage as a measure of shareholders’ risk-taking incentives (as, for example, John
et al., 2010).
Now, a CEO’s incentives to take on risk will depend not only on the firm’s leverage, which determines the
impact of the volatility of firm value on the firm’s equity value, but also on the size of his equity holdings,
which determines how much the executive’s wealth is influenced by changes in the firm’s equity value. Since,
in addition to stock, CEOs often hold substantial amounts of options, we measure the exposure of a CEO’s
wealth to changes in equity value by means of delta, which we define, as it is customary in the executive
compensation literature, as the approximate change in CEO wealth associated with a 1% change in the stock
price (see, e.g., Brockman et al., 2010):
delta = ∆S + ∆O =
[
nS
(
S
100
)]
+
[∑
i
ni
∂Oi
∂S
(
S
100
)]
, (2)
where ∆S and ∆O denote the delta from stocks and options, respectively, nS denotes the number of shares
of the firm’s stock held by the CEO, S the stock price, and i, ni, and Oi are the identifier of the option
grant, the number of options of grant i, and the value of the options of grant i, respectively. A CEO’s delta,
thus, depends on the CEO’s holdings of the firm stock and options, as well as on the sensitivity of the option
holdings to changes in the stock price. In Appendix A, we describe how we compute delta and option vega.
To incorporate both the sensitivity of equity value to changes in firm risk (as proxied by leverage) and
the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to changes in equity value (as measured by delta), we define our measure
16Guay (1999) proposes an approximation to the sensitivity of equity value to volatility and finds that this sensitivity is
generally very small for a sample of US CEOs in 1993, consistently with a generally small leverage in that sample. Because of
this result, subsequent work on risk-taking incentives has ignored the incentives stemming from stock holdings and has focused
solely on option vega.
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of risk-taking incentives, which we label levered delta (LD), simply as the product of firm leverage and delta:
LD = delta× leverage. (3)
Since we do not observe the firm’s market value, we measure leverage (following Fahlenbrach et al., 2012) as
the quasi-market value of leverage, computed as the ratio of the quasi-market value of the firm (measured
as the book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity) divided by the market
value of equity.
We define LD as the product of delta and leverage because this is the simplest measure that ensures
both that LD is increasing in leverage and that the impact of leverage on the CEO’s risk-taking incentives
is increasing in the CEO’s exposure to the firm’s equity value. An alternative route to obtain a measure
of the risk-taking incentives generated by CEOs’ holdings of stock and options, followed by Chesney et al.
(2012), is to derive the measure from a structural valuation model. We discuss the relation between the two
approaches in Section 8.
As Figure 1 illustrates, the expected payoff of a call option at expiration is increasing in the volatility
of the underlying asset. However, a higher volatility need not increase the expected utility of a risk averse
individual who cannot freely trade or hedge the option, because the higher volatility increases the risk of the
executive’s wealth. (Lambert et al., 1991; Guay, 1999; Ingersoll, 2006). Moreover, the CEO’s risk premium
will tend to be higher the larger the exposure of the CEO’s wealth to changes in the firm’s stock, that is, the
larger the CEO’s delta. Since the restricted stock and executive stock options that are part of executives’
compensation packages are typically subject to vesting restrictions, not tradeable, and there are limitations
to executives’ ability to hedge their exposure to their firms’ equity value, several articles propose using delta
as a measure of the sensitivity of the risk premium to changes in stock volatility (Guay, 1999; Knopf et al.,
2002; Coles et al., 2006; Brockman et al., 2010). Taking into account delta when measuring incentives is
especially important in our case, since for low leverage levels, increases in delta (and, thus, in LD) will have
a small impact on risk-taking incentives, whereas, at the same time, they will increase the CEO’s exposure
to the firm’s risky stock. Therefore, we use delta, in combination with LD, as a measure of the disincentives
to increase risk stemming from executives’ nondiversifiable exposure to their firms’ equity risk.
Panel A in Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the incentive measures computed in year 2006.17
17We note that we compute the incentive measures differently for seven firms because of data availability or management
changes. In three firms (First Niagara, Goldman Sachs, and UnionBanCal Corporation), the CEO retires in 2006. Since
retirement years are highly atypical, for these firms we compute the incentive measures in year 2005. Starting December
15, 2006, SEC disclosure rules require firms to report disaggregated information of option grants awarded to CEOs. This
disaggregated information allows us to compute the risk incentive measures directly as described in Appendix A. However, a
few firms in our sample had an earlier fiscal year end, so that they did not have to comply with the new disclosure requirement
until the next fiscal year (2007). For such firms (Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, and
Washington Federal Savings) we use the one year approximation technique described in Core and Guay (2002).
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The incentive measures display substantial dispersion, with standard deviations at least twice as large as the
mean and with the 90th percentile being ten times as large as the median and about a hundred times larger
than the 10th percentile. Panel B in Table 2 displays the correlations between LD, delta, and option vega.
Although LD is positively correlated with option vega, the correlation is relatively low. Therefore, LD and
vega measure different things in our sample. Delta has a positive correlation with both option vega and LD,
and the strong correlation between delta and LD indicates that the variation in LD does not simply reflect
variation in leverage.
4 Risk-taking incentives and failure
4.1 Empirical strategy
To estimate the relation between risk-taking incentives prior to the financial crisis and bank failure during the
crisis we measure CEO risk-taking incentives in year 2006. This choice of measurement period is determined
by several requirements. We require the period to be sufficiently close to the crisis to be able to potentially
attribute to the compensation incentives in the measurement period an impact on the probability of failure
during the crisis. We also require that the incentive measurement period not be a crisis year for two reasons.
First, to the extent that bank failure was motivated by actions taken by banks in the years prior to the crisis,
the measurement of incentives would take place after the actions they were supposed to incentivize. Second,
we would like to avoid capturing reverse causality: Measuring incentives during the crisis could capture the
reaction of CEOs’ compensation packages to negative realizations of uncertainty during the crisis. The period
2003–2006 satisfies these two requirements. However, the choice of year 2006 as the measurement period
also maximizes the availability and quality of the compensation data, because a new set of compensation
disclosure requirements became effective in this year. Thus, before year 2006, the information on pension
benefits and termination payments is very limited, and the information regarding executive stock options
improves in 2006. Moreover, other studies have used 2006 as their measurement period (notably, Fahlenbrach
and Stulz, 2011), which makes it easier to compare our results with theirs.
Although we have a panel with firm and compensation data, by construction we have a single cross section
of the dependent variable (failure). Therefore, our empirical specifications are cross-sectional regressions with
failure during the crisis as the dependent variable and incentives measured in 2006 as the explanatory variable
of interest. The use of bank failure during the financial crisis as the dependent variable rules out the use of
fixed firm or CEO effects to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
Since we would like to capture the potential effect of risk-taking incentives on the likelihood of failure,
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we cannot include as controls in our regressions measures of risk taking that could be the result of those
incentives. To clarify this point, suppose that the credit risk of a bank’s loan portfolio were the only variable
determining bank risk. In this case, even if compensation fully determined CEOs’ incentives to take on risk
(through the choice of riskiness of the loan portfolio), we would observe no effect of compensation on bank
risk if we controlled for the credit risk of the loan portfolio in our regressions. In Section 5 we, nonetheless,
investigate the effect of including leverage, as a measure of bank risk, in the estimating equations. The small
size of our sample significantly limits the power of the tests and further constrains our choice of control
variables in the estimating equations. Thus, we opt for parsimonious specifications and include independent
variables only if there are a priori reasons to expect them to be related to both risk-taking incentives and the
probability of bank failure. In Section 5 we discuss our choice of regressors in the multivariate specifications.
Here we emphasize that the goal of our analysis is not to accurately predict bank failure but to estimate the
relation between pre-crisis incentives and bank failure during the crisis.
Our main specification throughout the paper is the linear probability model:
failedi = α+ βwi,2006 + δ∆i,2006 + xi,2006γ + εi, (4)
where failedi is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm fails in the period from 2007 to 2010, w is a measure
of risk-taking incentives (option vega or LD), ∆ is the CEO’s delta, and xi,2006 is a vector of controls, which
may include lagged values. Linear probability models have the advantage of easy interpretability, yet are
necessarily misspecified because they do not restrict probabilities to lie between zero and one. The small size
of our sample, however, makes estimation of nonlinear models (such as probit or logit models) imprecise.18
Therefore, we focus on the results from linear probability models, although in Section 8 we also evaluate
the robustness of our results to both non-linear transformations of the incentive measures and non-linear
specifications of the estimating equation.
It is important to note that the risk-taking incentive measures are likely to be quite noisy approximations
to the true risk-taking incentives implied by CEOs’ holdings of stock and options. Therefore, even if the
measurement error is unrelated to the underlying incentives, the coefficients on the risk-taking incentive
measures will tend to be biased towards zero because of attenuation bias.
4.2 Univariate results
In Panel C of Table 2, we compare the means and medians of the incentive measures in the subsamples
of failed and surviving financial institutions. The mean LD among failed banks is almost four times larger
18The small sample size also recommends against alternative specifications, such as duration models.
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than among surviving banks and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. At the same time,
although failed banks exhibit a higher option vega, the difference in mean option vega between failed and
surviving banks is smaller and not statistically significant at the 10% significance level. We obtain similar
results if we compare the medians of the two subsamples. Therefore, the comparison of the subsamples
of failed and surviving banks shows that the measure of risk-taking incentives matters: Whereas failed
banks have substantially higher risk-taking incentives as measured by LD, the difference is small and not
statistically significant if measured by option vega.
In Table 3 we report estimated coefficients of the simple linear probability model (4) without controls.
The univariate results show that a change of one standard deviation in LD is associated with about a 0.10
(ten percentage points) increase in the probability of failure, and the estimated coefficient is statistically
significant at the 1% level. Increasing levered delta from its median to the 90th percentile would increase
the probability of failure by 0.09. Therefore, increases in risk-taking incentives, when measured by LD, are
associated with a statistically and economically significant change in the probability of failure.
If we measure incentives by means of option vega, however, the estimated coefficient is smaller (a one
standard deviation change in option vega is associated with a 0.03 increase in the probability of failure)
and not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Therefore, with a different risk measure
and a somewhat different sample, our results replicate those of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), who find no
statistically significant relation between option vega and bank risk taking. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find
a positive and statistically significant coefficient for delta. In column 3 of Table 3, we also report a positive
coefficient for delta in a univariate specification, although it is not statistically significant at conventional
significance levels. In light of our results, a plausible interpretation of Fahlenbrach and Stulz’s positive
coefficient for delta is that it is due to the positive correlation between delta and the risk-taking incentives
not captured by option vega. In fact, when we estimate the baseline linear probability model (4) with
LD and delta as regressors, the coefficient for delta becomes negative and the coefficient for LD increases
substantially, and both estimates are significantly different from zero at the one percent level. Although
the negative coefficient for delta implies that increasing delta would reduce the probability of failure for low
enough levels of leverage, the leverage of the firms in the sample is sufficiently high to guarantee that the
predicted marginal effect of delta is positive for all but seven firms.
The results in Table 3 are consistent with a causal effect of CEO compensation on bank risk. However,
there are, obviously, alternative plausible explanations for the results. In particular, LD may be correlated
with bank or CEO characteristics that either make banks inherently more risky or provide CEOs other
incentives to take on risk. In the next section, we propose and evaluate the plausibility of several alternative
explanations for the univariate results. Hereafter, we focus on LD as the measure of CEOs’ risk-taking
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incentives stemming from the CEOs’ stock and option holdings, although in Section 8 we also consider an
alternative measure.
5 Alternative explanations
5.1 Other sources of incentives
The positive relation between LD and the probability of failure could be due to the correlation between LD
and other, more relevant, determinants of CEOs’ risk choices. First, the implicit incentives created by the
threat of replacement could be more powerful in determining CEOs’ risk choices than concerns about the
sensitivity of current wealth to firm risk. These implicit incentives will arise if banks pay CEOs more than
their reservation value and bank risk affects the probability of termination (as in standard efficiency wage
models). Whether the threat of replacement provides incentives to increase or decrease risk will hinge on
the determinants of CEO replacement. If CEOs are replaced only when firm performance is dismal, then the
threat of termination may, in general, provide incentives to reduce risk, since CEOs will seek to lower the
probability of negative tail risk (see, e.g., Eckbo and Thorburn, 2003). On the other hand, if continuation
as CEO requires being at the top of the distribution of performance, then the threat of replacement may
provide incentives for taking on risk, since moderately poor performance would have similar implications as
extremely poor performance, whereas the CEO would benefit from very strong performance. In the former
case, our results could be explained by the presence of weaker termination incentives in firms with higher
LD; in the latter case, by a positive correlation between LD and termination incentives. In either case,
if termination incentives dominated those provided by CEOs’ equity portfolios, controlling for termination
incentives would significantly reduce the estimated coefficient for LD. Although we cannot measure the
sign and the magnitude of the effect of termination incentives on risk taking at each firm in our sample,
there are several measures that are likely to be correlated with the strength of those incentives. First,
the incentives stemming from the threat of replacement are, other things equal, likely to be stronger for
CEOs with a higher total pay, to the extent that at least part of the pay premium reflects quasirents and
not merely compensation for unobserved general skills, which would also increase their reservation value.
Second, termination incentives are also likely to be stronger for younger CEOs, since the number of periods
in which these CEOs may earn rents if they are not replaced is higher. Therefore, including total pay and
CEO age in the estimating equation is likely to capture at least part of the effect of termination incentives
on risk taking. Golden parachutes (which are termination payments associated with a change in control of
the firm, such as a takeover or a merger) or more general severance pay may also affect a CEO’s termination
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incentives. Other things equal, more generous termination payments reduce the CEO’s downside risk and,
thus, increase his risk-taking incentives. Therefore, if termination payments were positively related to LD,
they could explain our univariate results. Termination payments could also be set in place in firms at which
there is an inherently higher risk of CEO replacement or a higher sensitivity of replacement decisions to firm
performance. If either of these two factors is associated both with firms’ inherent riskiness and with LD,
this association could help explain our univariate results.
CEOs may also have incentives to take or hedge risks to affect the perception that investors have of their
ability, since this perception is likely to have a significant impact on their career prospects (DeMarzo and
Duffie, 1995; Breeden and Viswanathan, 1998). Again, the sign of the relation between the strength of these
career concerns and CEOs’ incentives to take on risk is not clear a priori. However, irrespectively of the sign
of this relation, the career concerns of older CEOs are likely be weaker because more information about their
abilities has already accumulated and because there are fewer years left in which they may benefit from a
higher perceived ability. Therefore, age may act as a proxy for the strength of career concerns.
Finally, whereas LD and delta measure the incentives to take on risk stemming from CEOs’ equity
portfolios, there are other components of CEO compensation that may also influence CEOs’ risk-taking
incentives. As emphasized by Sundaram and Yermack (2007), Edmans and Liu (2011), and Anderson and
Core (2013), defined benefit pension plans and deferred compensation are similar to debt claims. Such
debt-like claims (known as inside debt) provide incentives to take on (or limit) risk similar to those of
debtholders. Again, our univariate results could be due to the fact that LD is negatively correlated with
incentives stemming from inside debt. Therefore, we include inside debt as a control in our regressions, which
we define, following Cassell et al. (2012), as the sum of the present value of accumulated pension benefits
from all pension plans and the total aggregate balance in deferred compensation plans of the CEO.
5.2 Matching, risk, and compensation
Our univariate results could also be explained by the fact that high LD contracts are the least costly contracts
to compensate the CEOs of inherently riskier firms or those CEOs who are more likely to engage in risky
practices.
In standard principal-agent models, the performance sensitivity of pay should be, other things equal,
negatively correlated with firm riskiness, since the cost of linking pay to performance (in terms of a higher
risk premium that has to be paid to the CEO) is higher for firms with more volatile performance.19 However,
if riskier firms were matched with more risk-tolerant CEOs, in equilibrium riskier firms could offer contracts
19See Prendergast (2002) for a discussion of the standard models and the empirical evidence relative to the relation between
risk and incentives.
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with greater pay-performance sensitivity (Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002). Cheng et al. (2014) also consider
the possibility that firms that are inherently riskier (which would make a low sensitivity of pay to performance
optimal) are also firms in which the marginal return of CEO effort is higher (which would make a high pay-
performance sensitivity optimal). If the relation between riskiness and the marginal productivity of CEO
effort is positive and strong enough, the CEOs of riskier firms will not have significantly lower deltas and
could even have higher deltas (and, as a result, higher values of LD in highly levered firms).
Larger banks could be inherently risky (because of, say, their complexity) or more likely to engage in
certain risky practices (because, for example, the existence of a too-big-to-fail implicit guarantee). At the
same time, a well known regularity in executive compensation is that CEO pay is increasing in firm size.
To the extent that a larger total pay also implies a larger equity pay (because, say, fixed pay is limited
by legal or reputational constraints), firm size could be, somewhat mechanically, positively correlated with
LD.20 Including size in our regressions could control for the impact of size on both riskiness and LD. As we
discuss in Section 4.1, however, we do not want to include controls that may be themselves measures of bank
riskiness. Since risky expansion policies in the years prior to the crisis may have influenced bank size as of
2006 (Fahlenbrach et al., 2012), we measure firm size in year 2003 (although we note that measuring size in
2006 does not affect our results).
Finally, there may be CEO characteristics that determine CEOs’ risk choices or risk tolerance, and
different compensation contracts may attract CEOs of different characteristics or be optimal given different
risk-relevant CEO characteristics. For example, it is plausible that firms with more risk tolerant CEOs will
have stronger incentives and higher risk as a result of CEO choices (see, e.g., Dittmann and Maug, 2007).
We do not have a measure for CEOs’ risk aversion. However, we can control for variables that are likely to
be correlated with it. First, CEO age may be correlated with CEOs’ risk aversion, CEOs’ estimates of the
risk of different policies (for example, older CEOs may have lived through previous crises, like the savings
and loans crisis, in positions of responsibility), or CEO overconfidence. Similarly, if CEOs’ risk aversion
decreases with their wealth, a measure of CEOs’ wealth may also allow us to partly control for differences
in risk aversion. Therefore, we also control for CEO wealth (other than the wealth in the form of their own
firm’s equity) in our regressions, using the measure of non-firm wealth provided by Dittmann and Maug
(2007).21
20Size could have the opposite effect of reducing the probability of failure if larger banks were more diversified, had more
skilled managers, if there were economies of scale in risk management, or if, despite the potentially perverse incentives they
create, the net effect of too-big-to-fail guarantees on the probability of failure were negative. However, given that there is a
positive correlation between incentive measures and size in our sample, if the correlation between size and failure probability
had a negative sign, then it would not explain our univariate results.
21We thank the authors for providing their data online at http://people.few.eur.nl/dittmann/data.htm.
17
5.3 Risk-taking incentives or risk?
By construction, LD is increasing in firm leverage (as long as delta is positive) and will, thus, be positively
correlated with firm leverage unless the correlation between delta and leverage is negative and sufficiently
strong. At the same time, leverage may be interpreted as a measure of firm risk. Therefore, an alternative
explanation of our results is that LD does not measure risk-taking incentives but, instead, firm risk itself. In
such a case, our results would just imply that the value of some increasing function of firm risk is associated
with a higher probability of failure.
To the extent that a higher risk of failure increases risk shifting incentives, distinguishing the effect of an
exogenous increase in firm risk from the effect of the increase in risk generated by the stronger risk shifting
incentives is difficult. However, as a crude way to evaluate the possibility that LD simply measures bank
leverage, one can control for leverage in the regressions. If the relation between LD and failure is due to the
fact that the former is simply a proxy for leverage, then controlling for leverage should make the coefficient
for LD vanish. Since the relation between leverage and the probability of failure may be nonlinear, we also
include leverage squared in the regressions. However, as we discuss in Section 4.1, if CEOs have the ability
to determine leverage and leverage is an important determinant of risk, controlling for leverage could make
the estimated coefficient of incentives vanish, even if risk-taking incentives fully determined leverage and,
thus, risk. The substantial correlation between leverage and LD, together with our small sample size, may
also render the estimates less precise.
5.4 Risk vs. poor management
Another possible interpretation of our results is that failure is not measuring risk taking but, rather, poor
management. Thus, the univariate results could be due to the fact that firms with worse prospects or less
able managers may have provided their CEOs stronger incentives for effort prior to the crisis. If these
incentives did not succeed in improving banks’ prospects, banks with stronger incentives prior to the crisis
(which, through a higher delta, could plausibly translate into higher LD) may have had a higher probability
of failure. Alternatively, LD may be negatively correlated with CEOs’ incentives to exert effort or make
sound decisions (although a priori it is not clear why this should be so). To account for this possibility we
also include firm performance prior to the crisis (measured by either ROA or stock returns) as a control in
the regressions.
Table 4 displays the sign of the relation between different variables and the probability of failure predicted
by the explanations discussed in this section. For a proposed explanation to potentially explain the positive
relation between LD and bank failure, the sign of the relation between LD and the variables that have to
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do with that explanation should be the same as the predicted sign of the relation between those variables
and failure. As a way of evaluating the plausibility of the different explanations, in Table 4 we display in
boldface the predicted signs that are equal both i) to the sign of the difference in the corresponding variable
between the subsamples of failed and surviving firms, and ii) to the sign of the sample correlation between
that variable and LD.22
5.5 Results
In Panels A and B of Table 6, we report the results of estimating our linear probability model including the
different control variables discussed above. The first noteworthy result is that the coefficients for LD and
delta remain highly statistically significant and with the same signs as in the specification without controls:
Greater risk-taking incentives, as measured by LD, are associated with a higher probability of failure during
the crisis. Moreover, including controls other than termination payments does not affect the magnitude of
the estimated coefficients for LD and delta. The magnitude of the coefficients increases if severance pay
or golden parachutes are included as controls. However, the change is not due to the inclusion of these
controls, but to the fact that there are a few firms for which information on termination payments is not
available.23 It turns out that the companies with no information on termination payments include four of the
five investment banks (which have very large values of LD and delta). In Section 8 we analyze the influence
that these observations may have on our results.
The second implication of the results in Table 6 is that, with the exception of leverage, none of the pro-
posed controls has an estimated coefficient different from zero at conventional significance levels. Moreover,
the estimated coefficients are generally of small magnitude. We highlight that the estimated coefficients
for both ROA and stock returns in the period from 2004 to 2006 are positive. The sign and statistical
significance of these coefficients (as well as the, unreported, positive correlation between LD and both ROA
and pre-crisis stock returns) do not support the hypothesis that a high LD is associated with persistent
underperformance or that this persistent underperformance can explain bank failure during the crisis.
Although the coefficients of both leverage and leverage squared are statistically significant, including
these variables in the regression barely affects the estimated coefficients for LD and delta. Therefore, the
relation between the probability of failure and LD is not simply due to the linear correlation between LD
and leverage. Thus, either the relation between leverage and the probability of failure is nonlinear in a way
that is captured by LD (and not by a quadratic function of leverage), or the interaction between leverage
22In the Online Appendix, we report the correlations between the different variables and between them and LD, as well as
the results of tests of the difference in means and medians between the subsamples of failed and surviving firms.
23In unreported results, we run the specification in column 1 of Panel A (with only size as a control) for the subsample of
firms with information on severance pay, and we obtain a coefficient identical to the ones reported in columns 6-8 of Panel A.
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and CEO compensation has a positive relation with risk beyond the direct impact of leverage on risk.
6 Bank governance
According to managerial power theories of CEO pay, the CEOs of poorly governed banks are likely to be
paid more. If higher pay is not accompanied by changes in compensation structure, the CEOs of poorly
governed firms will have larger equity holdings and, thus, other things equal, stronger risk-taking incentives
if their firms are highly levered. Moreover, according to some managerial power theories of CEO pay, poorly
governed firms may structure CEO compensation so as to camouflage the level of that compensation. In
particular, poorly governed firms may make greater use of equity compensation, especially stock options,
because these forms of compensation can be justified as providing incentives to the manager and because the
cost to the firm of these compensation vehicles may be easier to conceal or undervalue (Bebchuk and Fried,
2004). Therefore, LD (which increases with the size of a CEO’s stock and option holdings) may be higher for
the CEOs of poorly governed firms. At the same time, the CEOs of poorly governed banks may make riskier
choices for reasons unrelated to the risk-taking incentives captured by LD. For example, entrenched CEOs
may be less likely to be replaced if the bank performs poorly. Therefore, these CEOs may not suffer much
from downside risk and benefit as much as other CEOs from upside risk, which would make risky strategies
more attractive for more entrenched CEOs. Worse governed firms may also have poorer risk management
systems, which may allow for the excessive accumulation of risk.24
To investigate the impact of bank governance on the probability of bank failure, we consider several
standard measures of the quality of corporate governance: board independence (measured as the percentage
of directors who are independent); board size (since larger boards have often been described as less effective);
the Governance index of Gompers et al. (2003); and the Entrenchment index of Bebchuk et al. (2009). The
latter two indices attempt to measure the degree of managerial entrenchment, with higher values of the
indices denoting greater managerial entrenchment. We compute board independence and board size using
information from RiskMetrics, BoardEx, and proxy statements. We obtain the data for the Governance
index from Andrew Metrick’s webpage,25 and the data for the Entrenchment index from Lucian Bebchuk’s
webpage.26
Table 7 displays summary statistics of the governance variables. Boards are relatively large (which is
24We note that poor governance may also decrease firm risk. For example, less entrenched managers may need to achieve
stellar performance to keep their job (which would increase risk incentives), whereas more powerful managers may be able to
remain at their post with mediocre performance. To the extent that entrenched managers earn greater rents, they may also
be less inclined to follow policies that increase the probability of default, since default (or regulator intervention to replace the
management team) would imply the loss of those rents. In any case, what matters for the argument is that governance may be
associated with firm risk through channels other than the incentives measured by LD.
25http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/data.html.
26http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml.
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consistent with the size and complexity of the banks in the sample), and there is not a large heterogeneity
in board independence. Otherwise, the levels and variation in the governance indices are similar to those
reported in previous articles (Gompers et al. (2003), Bebchuk et al. (2009)).
We first check whether including standard governance measures as controls affects the size or sign of
the coefficients of the incentive measures. As we report in Table 8, the estimated coefficient for LD and
its standard error are largely unchanged with respect to the benchmark specification with only firm size as
control. Moreover, none of the coefficients associated with the governance variables are statistically significant
at conventional levels. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients is also relatively small, with one standard
deviation changes in the variables associated with changes in the probability of failure between 0.008 and
0.035 for all variables and specifications. The results, thus, suggest that, controlling for compensation
incentives, bank governance quality is not associated with banks’ probability of failure.
Despite the above results, governance quality could still be responsible for firms’ risk choices if it deter-
mined the risk-taking incentives embedded in CEO pay. To evaluate this possibility, we regress our measures
of incentives on different governance variables. The results, reported in Table 8, show that only board size
has a statistically significant relation with LD. The coefficient is negative, which indicates that larger boards,
often perceived as less effective, are associated with weaker risk-taking incentives.27 Whereas the coefficients
for the Governance index and the Entrenchment index suggest that worse governance (in the sense of greater
management entrenchment) is associated with weaker incentives, the coefficient for board independence sug-
gests that greater board independence (often interpreted as a sign of better governance) is associated with
weaker incentives. However, these coefficients are estimated very imprecisely, so our sample does not provide
clear evidence that managerial entrenchment or board independence are related to risk-taking incentives.
In summary, standard measures of the quality of corporate governance do little to explain bank risk, and
only board size has a statistically significant relation with CEOs’ risk-taking incentives, with an estimated
coefficient that suggests that CEO risk-taking incentives are stronger in firms with smaller boards. Our
results are, thus, broadly in line with the ones by Cheng et al. (2014) and Chesney et al. (2012), who find
no discernible relation between governance variables and bank risk or incentives. Since CEO risk-taking
incentives in 2006 may be the result of past governance quality instead of the governance quality in 2006, in
unreported results we also run the regressions reported in Table 8 with the governance variables measured in
2003 (2004 in the case of the indices, because of data availability) and find similar results, with only board
size having a discernible impact on LD.28
27Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) find performance to be decreasing in board size, but Coles et al. (2008) show
that performance is positively associated with board size for complex firms. However, these results should be interpreted with
caution because of potentially large unresolved endogeneity problems.
28In unreported results, we also find that there is no significant relation between any of the governance variables and failure
in specifications that omit the incentive variables LD and delta.
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7 Shareholder incentives, CEO incentives, and bank risk
Managers’ incentives to take on risk may be determined not by the wedge between managers’ and sharehold-
ers’ interests but, instead, by the incentives that shareholders themselves have to encourage risk taking. In
fact, because of a combination of limited liability, very high leverage, and implicit government guarantees,
bank shareholders may have an incentive to increase the risk of bank assets at the expense of depositors
and debtholders. As we discuss in Section 3, bank leverage may serve as a possible measure of shareholders’
incentives to shift risk to other claim holders (see also John et al., 2010). Because leverage in 2006 may
reflect to a larger extent the results of CEOs’ risk-taking incentives than shareholder incentives at the time
of setting CEO compensation, and because LD is, by construction, an increasing function of leverage in 2006,
we use leverage in 2003 as a measure of shareholders’ incentives to take on risk and estimate the relation
between this measure and LD.
Of course, by definition, the partial derivative of LD with respect to leverage is non-negative and equal
to delta. So, to the extent that there is some persistence in leverage, one would expect that, keeping delta
constant, LD (measured in 2006) would increase with year 2003’s leverage. However, if the shareholders of
more levered firms managed their CEO’s compensation to achieve a lower delta (that is, if delta is not kept
constant as leverage changes), the relation between LD and leverage could be flat or even negative.29 Indeed,
if debt markets accurately reflected bank risk, excessive risk would be borne by shareholders through higher
interest rates for the firm’s debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, it may be in the interest of those
firms whose shareholders have stronger incentives to shift risk to debtholders to design CEO compensation
of their managers so as to limit the managers’ incentives to take risk. It follows from this argument that the
CEOs of more levered banks will have lower pay-performance sensitivity (John and John, 1993). Therefore,
if shareholders bore the costs of higher default risk, then there need not be a positive correlation between
leverage and LD. However, because of deposit insurance, implicit government guarantees, or lack of sophis-
tication by depositors, the interest rates on banks’ debt and deposits may not reflect bank riskiness. In
such case, those banks whose shareholders have greater incentives to take on risk may also provide stronger
risk-taking incentives to their CEOs.
In Table 9, we report the results of estimating regressions of LD and delta (measured in 2006) on
leverage and firm size (both measured in 2003). As the table shows, LD is increasing in leverage and the
size of the coefficient is significant (a one standard deviation increase in leverage is associated with one half
standard deviation of LD). At the same time, the relation between delta and leverage is positive, although
the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. To further explore
29Let L denote leverage and ∆(L) denote the CEO’s delta as a function of L. Then, LD(L) = ∆(L)L and LD′(L) =
∆′(L)L+ ∆(L). Therefore, if ∆′(L) < 0, it can be the case that L > L′ and LD(L) ≤ LD(L′).
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the relation between lagged leverage and delta, we also regress each of delta’s two components, the delta
from stock (∆S) and the delta from options (∆O)—as defined in equation (2) and measured in 2006—on
bank size and leverage, measured in 2003. Again, the relation between lagged leverage and either component
of delta is not statistically significant and small in magnitude. Therefore, it does not appear as if more
levered banks adjust the sensitivity to performance of their CEOs’ wealth. This result is in contrast to
the finding reported by John et al. (2010) of a negative relation between pay-performance sensitivity and
leverage for a sample of bank holding companies in the period from 1993 to 2007. John et al. (2010) employ
a different definition of pay-performance sensitivity, namely the estimated relation between the dollar value
of CEO total compensation (which includes both total pay and the changes in the value of the CEO’s stock
and option holdings) and the dollar return to shareholders. To check whether the difference between their
results and ours is due to the different definition of pay performance sensitivity, we employ a measure of pay
performance sensitivity closer to the one used by John et al. (2010). In particular, we define ∆$ as the change
in the dollar value of the CEO’s portfolio of stock and options associated with a change of $1,000 in the firm’s
market capitalization.30 However, as Table 9 shows, this measure also has a positive, yet not statistically
significant relation with leverage. Therefore, the difference between John et al. (2010)’s results and ours may
be due either to their more inclusive definition of CEO wealth or to their different sample (of about 70 bank
holding companies per year) and sample period. In fact, they report a relation between leverage and delta
that is mostly negative for the years 1993-2002, but mostly positive for the years 2003-2006.
8 Robustness checks
8.1 Alternative measure of risk-taking incentives
We propose LD as a simple measure of the risk-taking incentives implicit in CEOs’ holdings of stock and
options. Chesney et al. (2012) and Anderson and Core (2013) propose alternative measures of CEO risk-
taking incentives that also incorporate the risk-taking incentives implied by CEOs’ stock holdings. Here,
we focus on Chesney et al.’s measure, because the measure proposed by Anderson and Core (2013) may be
problematic for highly levered firms, such as the banks in our sample. Chesney et al. propose a stylized
structural model of equity as a call option on the firm’s assets (as in Black and Scholes, 1973, and Merton,
1973) and derive the value of stock and options and their derivatives with respect to firm volatility in closed
form. In the baseline case in which the CEO holds nO identical options and nS shares, their measure of
30Formally, we define ∆$ =
dW
dS
1,000
N
, where W is the value of the executive’s portfolio of stocks and options, S the stock
price, and N the number of equity shares. Since market capitalization is N ×S, a change in the stock price of 1,000
N
would lead
to a change of $1,000 in market capitalization.
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risk-taking incentives (asset volatility vega or AVV) is defined as:
AV V = nO
dO
dσv
0.01 + nS
dS
dσv
0.01, (5)
where S is the stock price (as a call on firm value) and O is the value of the option (obtained as the value of
an option on another option), and the derivatives are taken with respect to the volatility of firm value, σv.
To check the robustness of our results to the use of an alternative measure of risk-taking incentives that
also takes into account the risk-taking incentives of equity, we compute AVV for all firms in the sample in
year 2006, following Chesney et al. (2012). (We briefly describe the methodology in Appendix A, but refer
to the article by Chesney et al., 2012, for the details.) In Panel A of Table 10, we report the correlation
of AVV with LD, delta, and option vega. Two results are especially noteworthy. The first one is the very
strong and positive correlation between LD and AVV (0.85). Despite their very different definitions, in our
sample, most of the action in AVV is captured by our simple measure LD. At the same time, AVV has a
low correlation with option vega, similar to the one between LD and option vega. Therefore AVV and LD,
on the one hand, and option vega, on the other hand, appear to measure different things. In Panel B of
Table 10, we replicate the main multivariate specifications reported in Table 6, with AVV replacing LD as
the measure of risk-taking incentives. The results are very similar both in terms of magnitude (for example,
a one standard deviation—10.38—increase in AVV would increase the probability of failure by 0.11) and
statistical significance.
8.2 Alternative risk measures
For the reasons discussed in Section 2, we use bank failure during the crisis as the measure of risk-taking prior
to the crisis. Since our measure is different from those used in prior research and conditions our empirical
strategy, in this section we study the relation between bank failure during the crisis and alternative risk
measures and check the robustness of our results to the use of these alternative measures.
We consider as alternative risk measures the volatility of stock returns and the market beta of the firm’s
stock (as in Cheng et al., 2014, or DeYoung et al., 2013) and the buy-and-hold returns of the firm’s stock (as
in Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). We first check whether higher levels of volatility or beta computed prior to
the crisis are associated with the incidence of bank failure. As Table 11 shows, there is no significant difference
in volatility or beta prior to the crisis between banks that would fail during the crisis and those that would
survive. In unreported regressions, we also estimate univariate linear probability and probit models of the
probability of failure with these risk measures (computed prior to the crisis) as the explanatory variable and
find that they contribute very little to explaining failure during the crisis. We also consider the possibility
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that changes in these variables in the run-up to the crisis may be associated with failure. However, as we
report in Table 11, changes in the risk measures prior to the crisis explain very little of the variation in
bank failure. Therefore, our results indicate that ex ante measures of volatility or beta capture little of the
exposure to the kind of bank risk that realized during the crisis and that led to the failure of a significant
fraction of the financial institutions in our sample.
However, when measured during the crisis period, all risk measures are strongly associated with bank
failure. Banks that eventually fail have significantly lower buy-and-hold returns in the period from July 1,
2007, to December 31, 2008 (which is the period employed by Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). Not surprisingly,
given the strong correlation between buy-and-hold returns, volatility, and beta, the latter two measures are
also strongly correlated with failure. Further, as we show in Table 11, the signs and statistical significance of
the coefficients are the same for all risk measures. Therefore, the difference between our results and those of
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), who use buy-and-hold returns, or Cheng et al. (2014), who use volatility and
beta, appears to be due to the different measure of risk-taking incentives and not to the measure of bank
risk.
8.3 Sample selection
The diversity of activities carried out by large financial institutions makes it difficult to determine unam-
biguous sample selection criteria. For this reason and for the sake of comparability, we also conduct our
analysis with the sample of financial institutions used by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011). Fahlenbrach and
Stulz’s sample contains only 98 firms and is not a proper subset of our sample. For example, Fahlenbrach
and Stulz include federal credit agencies, such as Fannie Mae, while we do not do so.31 As Column 1 in
Table 12 shows, the results are largely unchanged if we use this alternative sample of financial institutions.
There are, however, two differences. First, whereas in our sample the coefficient for delta is not statistically
significant in the univariate specification, it becomes statistically significant for the Fahlenbrach and Stulz’s
sample, in line with their results. The second difference is that the coefficients for delta and LD are not
statistically significant when estimated jointly in Fahlenbrach and Stulz’s sample. However, both differences
can be explained by the extremely high (0.91) correlation between LD and delta in their sample.
31Moreover, we seem to have compensation information for a larger number of firms from Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)’s
sample than Fahlenbrach and Stulz. This difference could be explained by the fact that we use a later version of the compensation
database.
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8.4 Failed institutions
Some of the steps of the procedure that we use to identify firms as failed require the use of some judgement
and soft information. In particular, as we discuss in Section 2, we consider two firms as failed (Mellon
Financial and Countrywide Financial) that were acquired during the crisis but do not clearly meet our
merger discount requirements. We also consider three firms as failed (Merrill Lynch, National City Corp
and Provident Bankshares) on the basis of information obtained from the media. Column 2 in Table 12
shows that results are largely unchanged if we consider that none of these five firms fail during the crisis. In
unreported results, we also consider each of the two groups separately, and the results are identical.
8.5 Investment banks
Our sample contains three primary dealers (Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch) that supervisors
do not identify as a regulated institution, but that we include because of their systemic importance. Moreover,
our sample also contains Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley, which the National Information Center of
the FFIEC identifies as regulated institutions. To investigate whether our results are driven by the inclusion
of the five largest investment banks, we estimate the baseline regressions excluding them from the sample. As
column 4 in Table 12 shows, the coefficients for the incentive variables remain highly statistically significant
and increase in magnitude, because, as we explain below, some of the investment banks have very large
values of the incentive variables. We find similar (unreported) results if we exclude only the investment
banks not identified as regulated institutions or if we include a dummy for the investment banks (rather
than excluding them from the sample).
8.6 Too big to fail institutions
We identify as failed those firms that either close or are acquired with the intervention of regulators. However,
some financial institutions may be too large for regulators to either allow them to fail or to be able to find
a suitable acquirer. These financial institutions may, thus, not be part of our list of failed institutions, even
if they took on large risks ex ante and experienced strongly negative outcomes as a result of those risks.
This possibility may bias our estimates towards zero if the risk-taking incentives of too-big-to-fail (or be
acquired) institutions are strong and if these firms took on large risks. On the other hand, it may lead us to
overestimate the relation between risk-taking incentives and bank risk if large banks take on large risks yet
opt for compensation arrangements with low values of LD.
We take two approaches to evaluate the potential biases generated by too-big-to-fail institutions. First,
following Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we consider Citigroup and Bank of America as failed, given the massive
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amount of aid they received from the government. As column 3 of Table 12 shows, considering these banks
as failed does not alter our results. Second, we identify the banks in the sample that could be considered
both too-big-to-fail and “too-big-to-be-acquired,” which we label TBTBA banks. There is obviously no
official list of TBTBA firms, so we consider the robustness of our results to different definitions. Our first
definition identifies as TBTBA those firms larger than the largest failed institution in our sample (with
size measured either as market capitalization or total assets in 2006).32 The other two definitions use the
Financial Stability Board’s lists of systemically important financial institutions (created in 2011) and global
systemically important banks (created in 2012). Our second definition considers as TBTBA all the U.S.
institutions on the 2011 list. The 2012 list divides the systemically important financial institutions into five
buckets, according to their level of systemic importance, with bucket five (one) containing the institutions
with the greatest (smallest) systemic importance. Finally, our third definition defines as TBTBA only those
firms on the 2011 list that are in buckets two to five (the ones with the greatest systemic importance) of
the 2012 list.33 To evaluate the potential biases introduced by TBTBA institutions, we include a dummy
variable for these firms in our regressions and run the regressions excluding the TBTBA firms from the
sample. For the sake of brevity, we report in columns 5-6 of Table 12 only the results obtained when we
exclude TBTBA banks, defined in terms of market capitalization or according to the 2011 list of systemically
important institutions, from the sample. The results, which are essentially identical if we apply the other
definitions or include dummies instead of excluding banks from the sample, show that our results are not
affected by the presence of TBTBA institutions.
8.7 Extreme values and specification
A possible concern about our results, especially given the small size of our sample, is that they may be
influenced by the presence of firms with extreme values of the incentive measures. In fact, some firms, such
as Bear Stearns, have very large values of LD. The presence of firms with very large values of LD in the
group of failed banks may lead to a positive estimated coefficient even if there is no positive relationship
between LD and failure. However, since the dependent variable lies between zero and one, the presence of
banks with very large values of LD among the banks with a value of one for the dependent variable may have
the opposite effect of biasing the estimated coefficient towards zero. To check the robustness of our results
32If size is measured by total assets, the largest failed institution is Merrill Lynch and the TBTBA institutions are Morgan
Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup. If size is measured by market capitalization in 2006, the largest
failed institution is Wachovia and the TBTBA institutions are Wells Fargo, J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup.
33The 2011 and 2012 lists contain the same eight US financial institutions: Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon,
Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells Fargo. Buckets two to five contain
all these banks except for State Street and Wells Fargo. Further restricting the list to buckets three to five would leave only
Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase as TBTBA. The list can be accessed at the Financial Stability Board’s website: https:
//www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_pa/tid_174/index.htm.
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to the presence of firms with very high values of the incentive measures (LD and delta), we winsorize them
at the 2% level and re-estimate the baseline univariate and bivariate regressions. As column 1 of Panel B in
Table 12 shows, the estimated coefficients remain statistically significant and are of similar magnitude.
A related concern is that the linear model given by expression (4) is necessarily misspecified, since the
dependent variable is bounded between zero and one. Although this misspecification may not be severe in
some cases, it may create substantial bias if, as it is the case with LD, the explanatory variable of interest has
a skewed distribution.34 Therefore, we also consider the robustness of our results to different specifications
that are nonlinear in LD. The first specification is a simple log linear model, in which we replace LD and delta
by the natural logarithm of one plus the corresponding variable (we add one because of the presence of firms
with zero or close to zero values for the incentive measures). This specification allows for a concave relation
between the incentive measures and the probability of failure and, at the same time, can be estimated by
OLS. The estimated coefficients, which we report in Column 2 of Panel B in Table 12, are highly statistically
significant. In columns 3 to 6 of Panel B in Table 12 we also report estimated marginal effects (evaluated
at the sample means of the explanatory variables) of probit and logit models. To better compare the results
with those from the linear probability model, we note that, for the univariate specification, an increase of one
standard deviation in LD (starting from the mean) is associated with changes in the probability of failure
of 0.09 (probit) and 0.08 (logit), very similar to the 0.10 change of the linear specification.35
The fact that our main results are largely robust to different specifications, the use of different subsamples,
different definitions of failure, and different risk measures suggests that our results are not an artifact of the
particular sample used in this paper, which could be a significant concern given the small sample size.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the relation between the risk-taking incentives created by executive compensation
and bank risk and study the potential determinants of those incentives.
Since financial institutions are highly levered, we propose a measure of the risk-taking incentives generated
by CEO compensation, levered delta (LD), which incorporates the incentives generated by the option-like
nature of the stock of levered institutions. We define LD as the product of leverage and the sensitivity of
the CEO’s wealth to changes in the firm’s stock price (delta).
34However, we note that our linear probability model generates almost no predicted values of the probability of failure outside
of the unit interval. Thus, for the univariate specification in column 1 of Table 3—with only LD as independent variable—all
predicted probabilities lie between 0 and 1, and for both the bivariate specification in column 4 of Table 3—with LD and
delta—and the specification with all controls in column 8 of Table 6 only one predicted value lies outside the unit interval.
35In columns 3 to 6 of Panel B in Table 12, we report robust standard errors rather than the standard errors implied by the
probit and logit models. However, the use of robust standard errors in probit or logit models is contentious. The estimated
probit and logit standard errors are smaller than the ones reported in the table and lead to coefficients for LD that are significant
at the 5% level in all specifications.
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To measure bank risk taking in the period prior to the 2007-2010 financial crisis we identify those banks
that failed during the crisis. Because of the potential for government intervention to facilitate the acquisition
of distressed banks by sounder financial institutions, we propose a definition of bank failure that identifies
as failed not only those financial institutions that went bankrupt or were forced into receivership, but also
those that were acquired with the assistance or intervention of supervisors. This ex post measure of bank
risk aims to sidestep the limitations of standard risk measures measured prior to the crisis, which may not
have been that informative about the actual risks taken by banks in the run-up to the crisis, as well as to
measure the full risk borne by banks, and not only the part borne by bank shareholders.
For our sample of large US financial institutions, we show that the risk-taking incentives implied by LD
are associated with a higher probability of failure during the financial crisis. We propose and investigate
different potential explanations for these results and interpret our findings as supporting two alternative
explanations. The first explanation is that the risk-taking incentives measured by LD did have an impact
on CEOs’ risk choices prior to the crisis. The second explanation is that inherently riskier banks found it
optimal to compensate their CEOs in ways that led to high values of LD. Further theoretical and empirical
work is needed to distinguish between the two alternatives. On the theory side, it may be useful to derive
the optimal compensation contract for bank CEOs under different assumptions of the roles played by bank
executives, boards of directors, and shareholders in determining and monitoring compensation decisions
and risk choices. The implications of these models could then be taken to the data to shed light on the
actual mechanism that links compensation and bank risk. The very different results obtained with option
vega and levered delta also suggest that more attention should be paid to deriving measures of risk-taking
incentives. On the empirical side, finding credible sources of exogenous variation in incentives remains the
main challenge to be addressed to be able to propose policy recommendations regarding the compensation
of bank executives.
We show that standard measures of governance quality do not help explain bank failure or the level of risk-
taking incentives. In contrast, CEOs’ risk-taking incentives are positively related to shareholders’ incentives
to shift risk to debtholders. These results suggest that either compensation incentives are designed to align
CEOs’ incentives with those of shareholders or, at least, that compensation policies are not set so as to
counteract the risk-taking incentives embedded in banks’ equity. In contrast to the theoretical prediction
of John and John (1993) that more levered firms would structure CEO compensation so as to limit CEOs’
incentives to take on risk, we find the CEOs’ pay-performance sensitivity to be largely unrelated to bank
leverage (which implies stronger risk-taking incentives for the CEOs of more levered banks). A possible
interpretation of our results is that, contrary to the shareholders in John and John (1993)’s model, bank
shareholders may not fully internalize the costs that risk shifting imposes to debtholders.
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Our results have several implications for bank regulation. First, in contrast to the results of prior studies,
our findings are consistent with compensation being a source of risk-taking incentives for bank executives.
However, we lack an exogenous source of variation in incentives that would allow us to identify their causal
effect on bank risk. Therefore, whether regulating executive compensation would have an impact on bank
risk remains an open question. We emphasize as well that, even if we provide evidence that is consistent
with a role for compensation incentives in determining bank risk, our results are largely orthogonal to the
question as to whether CEOs’ risk-taking incentives or bank risk prior to financial crisis were excessive. In
line with previous studies, we find no support for the proposition that improving bank governance by, say,
limiting managerial entrenchment or increasing board independence, would significantly reduce risk-taking
incentives or bank risk. However, our results are silent regarding some governance failures specific to banks,
which have also received attention from regulators, such as the financial background of directors, the quality
of the risk management systems, or the relevance in the organization of the executives in charge of risk
management.
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Table 1: Firm characteristics: summary statistics. S.d. denotes standard deviation and p10, p50, and
p90 correspond to percentiles 10, 50, and 90, respectively. Market cap. is the firm’s market capitalization
computed as total common equity multiplied by the price of the stock at the close of the calendar year.
Total assets is the book value of the total assets of the firm. Market cap. and total assets are measured in
billions of dollars. Leverage is the quasi-market value of leverage, computed as book value of assets minus
book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by the market value of equity. ROA is the ratio
of operating income before depreciation over total assets at the end of the previous year. All variables are
measured in 2006. Panel A displays summary statistics for our sample. The number of firms in the sample
is 125. Panel B displays summary statistics for the entire population of firms available in Compustat for
year 2006 with SIC codes between 6000 and 6050.
Panel A. Firms in the sample
Mean S.d. p10 p50 p90
Market cap. 15.73 39.57 0.62 2.04 31.49
Total assets 103.85 284.27 2.85 11.52 199.95
Leverage 6.36 2.85 3.93 5.64 9.33
ROA 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
Panel B. Compustat population (SIC codes 6000–6050)
Count Mean S.d. p10 p50 p90
Market cap. 747 4.40 18.92 0.04 0.17 4.50
Total assets 778 41.37 203.17 0.28 1.01 20.86
Leverage 746 7.28 3.19 4.31 6.52 10.97
ROA 759 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04
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Table 2: Incentive measures in year 2006: summary statistics. LD is the product of leverage and
delta, where leverage is the quasi-market value of leverage, as defined in Table 1, and delta is the change in
the value of the CEO’s portfolio of stock and options (measured in $ million) associated with a 1% change
in the price of the stock of the firm. Option vega is the change in the value of the CEO’s option portfolio
(measured in $ million) associated with a change of 0.01 in the standard deviation of the price of the stock.
All variables are measured in 2006. Panel A contains summary statistics. Panel B contains correlation
coefficients. Panel C contains the means and medians of the incentive variables for the subsamples of failed
and surviving institutions. Asterisks in the mean and median columns of the group of failed institutions
represent statistically significant differences according to the t-test of means and the rank-sum test for
differences in medians, respectively. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. The number of firms in the sample is 125.
Panel A. Incentive measures
Mean S.d. p10 p50 p90
LD 8.89 22.29 0.23 2.02 22.09
Option vega 0.32 0.55 0.00 0.08 0.90
Delta 1.34 4.24 0.04 0.37 2.97
Panel B. Pairwise correlations between incentive measures
LD Option vega Delta
LD 1
Option vega 0.2575 1
Delta 0.7175 0.2329 1
Panel C. Differences in means and medians between failed and surviving banks
Surviving Failed
Mean Median Mean Median
LD 6.34 1.72 23.06∗∗∗ 9.36∗
Option vega 0.30 0.07 0.46 0.15
Delta 1.23 0.30 2.00 1.03∗
N 106 19
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Table 3: Risk-taking incentives and bank failure. The table presents estimated coefficients of different
specifications of a linear probability model with failed as the dependent variable. Failed is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm fails in the period from 2007 to 2010. LD is the product of leverage and delta, where
leverage is the quasi-market value of leverage as defined in Table 1, and delta is the change in the value of
the CEO’s equity portfolio (measured in $ million) associated with a 1% change in the price of the stock of
the firm. Option vega is the change in the value of the CEO’s portfolio of options (measured in $ million)
associated with a change of 0.01 in the standard deviation of the stock price. LD, option vega, and delta are
measured in year 2006. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LD 0.004∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Option vega 0.065 0.059
(0.067) (0.069)
Delta 0.006 −0.023∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.009) (0.005) (0.008)
N 125 127 125 125 125
R2 0.073 0.011 0.004 0.107 0.012
Table 4: Alternative explanations. Each row corresponds to a possible explanation for the results in
Table 3. Each cell displays the expected sign of the relation between the variable corresponding to the cell’s
column and failure, according to the explanation corresponding to the cell’s row. A proposed explanation
may explain the results in Table 3 if the sign of the relation between a variable related to that explanation
and LD is the same as the sign reported in the corresponding cell. We display a sign in boldface if the
sample correlation between the corresponding variable and LD has the same sign as the difference in the
average value of the variable between the subsamples of failed and surviving banks and this sign is equal
to the predicted sign in the table. For example, according to the “risk aversion” explanation, CEO wealth
would have a positive relation with probability of bank failure, so we place a + sign in the corresponding
cell. Since the sample correlation between CEO wealth and LD is positive, we display the + sign in boldface.
CEO
pay
Age
Term.
payments
Inside
debt
Size Wealth Leverage
Pre-crisis
returns
Termination
incentives
+/− +/− +
Career
concerns
+/−
Debt-like
incentives
− −
Size + +
CEO risk
aversion
− +
LD measures
risk
+
Poor
management
−
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Table 5: Alternative explanations: summary statistics of relevant variables in year 2006. Firm
size (2003) is the log of total assets at the end of year 2003. Total pay is the total compensation received
by the CEO. It comprises salary, bonus, other annual payments, restricted stock grants, long term incentive
plan (LTIP) payouts, other compensation, and the value of option grants. CEO age denotes the CEO’s age
in years. G. parachute and severance pay are the contingent payments upon termination with and without
a change in control, respectively, as in year 2006’s proxy statements. Inside debt (Cassell et al., 2012) is
the sum of the present value of accumulated pension benefits from all pension plans and the total aggregate
balance in deferred compensation plans of the CEO at the end of 2006, as reported in Execucomp. Non-firm
wealth is the non-firm wealth of the CEO, as defined by Dittmann and Maug (2007). Leverage is the quasi-
market value of leverage, computed as book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value
of equity, divided by market value of equity. ROA is the ratio of operating income before depreciation over
total assets at the end of the previous year. Returns (avg.) is the average annual stock return in the period
2002-2006. All compensation variables are measured in millions of dollars. All variables are measured in
2006 unless stated otherwise.
Count Mean S.d. p10 p50 p90
count mean sd p10 p50 p90
Firm size (2003) 128 9.45 1.68 7.65 9.14 12.07
Total pay 125 6.89 10.37 0.66 2.20 20.37
CEO age 128 57.51 6.66 49.00 58.00 65.00
Severance pay 119 6.27 13.23 0.00 0.63 18.40
G. parachute 119 12.31 19.74 0.00 4.88 39.22
Inside Debt 118 8.69 15.50 0.00 3.40 26.96
Non-firm wealth 120 33.81 95.22 0.52 6.61 73.95
Leverage 128 6.36 2.85 3.93 5.64 9.33
ROA (avg.) 129 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Returns (avg.) 121 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.23
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Table 6: Risk-taking incentives and bank failure: multivariate results. The table presents es-
timated coefficients of different specifications of a linear probability model with failed as the dependent
variable. Failed is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm fails in the period from 2007 to 2010. LD is the
product of leverage and delta, where leverage is the quasi-market value of leverage as defined in Table 1,
and delta is the change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (measured in $ million) associated with a
1% change in the price of the firm’s stock. Leverage2 is leverage squared. All other variables are as defined
in Table 5. All variables are measured in year 2006 unless stated otherwise. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
Panel A. Firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and other incentives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LD 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.014)
Delta −0.022∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.006) (0.040)
Firm size (2003) 0.011 0.011 −0.025 −0.024 −0.019 0.017 −0.020
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.030)
Total pay 0.006 0.002
(0.005) (0.011)
CEO age −0.004 −0.002
(0.005) (0.006)
Severance pay 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
G. parachute 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.003)
Inside debt −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Non-firm wealth 0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
N 125 123 125 118 118 117 118 109
R2 0.109 0.124 0.115 0.166 0.165 0.164 0.111 0.151
Panel B. Risk and pre-crisis performance
(1) (2) (3)
LD 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Delta −0.012∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Firm size (2003) −0.004 0.005 0.015
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023)
Leverage 0.113∗∗
(0.049)
Leverage2 −0.005∗∗
(0.002)
ROA (avg.) 4.625
(3.742)
Return (avg.) 0.152
(0.314)
N 125 125 121
R2 0.174 0.128 0.112
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Table 7: Governance variables in year 2006: summary statistics. G-index is the Governance index
defined by Gompers et al (2003). E-index is the Entrenchment index, as defined by Bebchuck et al. (2009).
Board size is the number of members of the board of directors. Independence is the number of independent
directors divided by board size. All variables are measured in year 2006.
Count Mean S.d. p10 median p90
G-index 106 9.98 2.79 7.00 10.00 13.00
E-index 106 2.93 1.32 1.00 3.00 4.00
Independence 124 0.72 0.13 0.55 0.75 0.87
Board size 124 12.50 3.11 9.00 12.00 17.00
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Table 8: Governance, risk-taking incentives, and bank failure. Panel A displays estimated coeffi-
cients of different specifications of a linear probability model with failed as the dependent variable. Failed is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm fails in the period from 2007 to 2010. LD is the product of leverage
and delta, where leverage is the quasi-market value of leverage as defined in Table 1, and delta is the change
in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (measured in $ million) associated with a 1% change in the price
of the stock of the firm. G-index is the Governance index defined by Gompers et al (2003). E-index is the
Entrenchment index, as defined by Bebchuck et al. (2009). Board size is the number of members of the
board of directors. Independence is the number of independent directors divided by board size. All variables
are measured in year 2006, except Firm size (2003), which is the natural logarithm of total assets as of year
2003. Panel B displays estimated coefficients of different specifications of a linear model with LD as the
dependent variable. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Panel A. Governance, risk-taking incentives, and bank failure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LD 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Delta −0.023∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Firm size (2003) 0.015 0.012 0.017 0.023 0.019
(0.025) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025)
G-index 0.010 0.011
(0.011) (0.011)
E-index −0.013
(0.026)
Independence 0.065 0.141
(0.264) (0.321)
Board size −0.011 −0.009
(0.011) (0.012)
N 105 105 121 121 104
R2 0.126 0.122 0.121 0.129 0.133
Panel B. Governance and risk-taking incentives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm size (2003) 6.406∗∗∗ 5.737∗∗∗ 5.797∗∗∗ 6.394∗∗∗ 7.139∗∗∗
(1.781) (1.358) (1.487) (1.662) (1.853)
G-index −0.286 −0.366
(0.470) (0.586)
E-index −3.119
(2.495)
Independence −24.236 −34.496
(34.426) (41.261)
Board size −1.333∗∗∗ −1.556∗∗∗
(0.387) (0.480)
N 105 105 121 121 104
R2 0.187 0.213 0.210 0.225 0.254
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Table 9: Shareholder risk-taking incentives and CEO risk-taking incentives. The table shows
results from regressions in which the dependent variable is the variable indicated in the column heading
and the explanatory variables are Firm size (2003), which is the natural logarithm of total assets as of year
2003, and leverage (2003), which is the quasi-market value of leverage as of year 2003. LD is the product
of leverage and delta, where delta is the change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (measured in
$ million) associated with a 1% change in the price of the stock of the firm. ∆S is the delta from stock
holdings, and ∆O the delta from option holdings, as defined in equation (2). ∆$ is the change in the value
of the CEO’s equity portfolio (measured in $ million) associated with a $1,000 change in the firm’s market
capitalization. All dependent variables are measured in year 2006. *, ** and *** represent significance levels
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
LD Delta ∆S ∆O
Firm size (2003) 3.661∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 0.395 0.288∗∗∗
(1.037) (0.255) (0.250) (0.053)
Leverage (2003) 4.329∗∗ 0.021 0.054 −0.037
(2.015) (0.221) (0.211) (0.027)
N 124 124 123 122
R2 0.438 0.080 0.031 0.312
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Table 10: Risk-taking incentives and bank failure: alternative measure of risk-taking incen-
tives. The table replicates Table 6 with Chesney et al. (2012)’s asset volatility vega (AVV ) as the measure
of risk-taking incentives. AVV is the change in the value of the CEOs portfolio of stocks and options as-
sociated with a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of the value of the assets of the firm, as defined and
computed by Chesney et al. (2012). The table presents estimated coefficients of different specifications of a
linear probability model with failed as the dependent variable. Failed is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
firm fails in the period from 2007 to 2010. Delta is the change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio
(measured in $ million) associated with a 1% change in the price of the stock of the firm. All other variables
are as defined in Table 5. All variables are measured in year 2006, unless stated otherwise. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
Panel A. Correlation table
AVV LD Delta Option vega
AVV 1 0.8472 0.2499 0.1604
Panel B. Multivariate results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AVV 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.051∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.002) (0.030)
Delta −0.003 −0.004∗ −0.001 −0.005 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.013)
Firm size (2003) 0.016 0.016 −0.016 −0.014 −0.014 0.020 −0.019
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.030)
Total pay 0.006 0.004
(0.005) (0.011)
CEO age −0.004 −0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Severance pay 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.004)
G. parachute −0.000 −0.000
(0.002) (0.003)
Inside debt 0.000 −0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Non-firm wealth 0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
N 125 123 125 118 118 117 118 109
R2 0.104 0.123 0.110 0.163 0.162 0.161 0.108 0.141
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Table 11: Alternative measures of bank risk. Volatility (2003-2006) and Volatility (2007-2008) are
the standard deviations, measured over the periods indicated, of daily returns for firms with at least 60
days of trading. Beta (2003-2006) and Beta (2007-2008) are the firm’s market betas measured over the
periods indicated. To measure beta we use the CRSP value-weighted index return including dividends as the
market return. BHR (2007-2008) denotes the buy-and-hold returns from 08/01/07 to 12/31/08, computed
following Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011). Diff-volatility (diff-beta) is the difference between the firm volatility
(beta) in the period 2005-2006 and the firm volatility (beta) in the period 2003-2004. Panel A contains
the means and medians of the ex ante risk measures (Volatility (2003-2006) and Beta (2003-2006)) for the
subsamples of failed and surviving institutions. Panel B contains the means and medians of the ex post risk
measures (Volatility (2007-2008), Beta (2007-2008), and BHR (2007-2008)) for the subsamples of failed and
surviving institutions. Asterisks in the mean and median columns of the group of failed institutions represent
statistically significant differences according to the t-test of means and the rank-sum test for differences in
medians, respectively. Panel C reports the results of linear regressions with LD and delta as explanatory
variables and the ex post risk measure indicated in the column title as dependent variable. *, ** and ***
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. We report robust standard
errors in parentheses in Panel C.
Panel A. Ex ante risk measures and bank failure: surviving vs. failed banks
Surviving Failed
Mean Median Mean Median
Volatility (2003-2006) 0.46 0.44 0.47 0.47
Beta (2003-2006) 1.04 1.00 1.09 1.05
diff - volatility −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01
diff - beta 0.24 0.20 0.29 0.25
N 102 19
Panel B. Ex post risk measures and bank failure: surviving vs. failed banks
Surviving Failed
Mean Median Mean Median
Volatility (2007-2008) 0.86 0.83 1.60∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗
Beta (2007 - 2008) 1.26 1.26 2.08∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗
BHR (2007 - 2008) −0.20 −0.21 −0.88∗∗∗ −0.91∗∗∗
N 101 19
Panel C. Risk-taking incentives and risk: alternative risk measures
Volatility (2007-2008) Beta (2007-2008) BHR (2007-2008)
LD 0.007∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ −0.007∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
Delta −0.023∗∗∗ −0.033∗ 0.018∗
(0.007) (0.018) (0.010)
N 120 120 117
R2 0.083 0.222 0.079
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Appendices
A Incentive Measures
Delta. Delta is defined in equation (2), which we reproduce here:
∆ = ∆S + ∆O =
[
nS
(
S
100
)]
+
[∑
i
ni
∂Oi
∂S
(
S
100
)]
, (2)
where ∆S and ∆O denote the delta from stocks and options, respectively, nS denotes the number of (restricted
and unrestricted) shares of the firm’s stock held by the CEO, S the stock price, and i, ni, and Oi are the
identifier of the option grant, the number of options of grant i, and the value of an option of grant i,
respectively.
To compute ∆O, we follow Guay (1999) and assume that the value of an option of grant i (Oi) is given
by the Black and Scholes (1973)’s formula for valuing European call options, as modified to account for
dividends by Merton (1973):
Oi = [Se
−dtN(Zi)−Ke−rTiN(Zi − σST (1/2)i ], (6)
where N is cumulative probability function for the standard normal distribution, Ki is the exercise price of
the option, σS is the expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option, r is the natural logarithm of
risk-free interest rate, Ti is the time to maturity of the option in years, d is the natural logarithm of expected
dividend yield over the life of the option, and Zi is defined as follows:
Zi =
ln( SKi ) + Ti(r − d+
σ2S
2 )
σS
√
Ti
. (7)
We then obtain the derivative of the value of each option with respect to the stock price S:
∂Oi
∂S
= e−dTiN(Zi). (8)
Option Vega. Following Guay (1999), we define option vega in equation (1) in the text as follows:
option vega =
∑
i
ni
∂Oi
∂σS
× 0.01. (1)
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From expression (6), one obtains:
∂Oi
∂σS
= e−dTiN ′(Zi)S
√
Ti, (9)
where N ′ is the density of the standard normal distribution and all other variables are as defined above.
To compute the value of the different variables in the expressions above, we follow the procedure detailed
by Coles et al. (2013).36
Asset Volatility Vega (AVV). We follow the procedure described by Chesney et al. (2012) to compute
the Asset Volatility Vega from stocks (AV VS) and from options (AV VO). Here we provide only an outline
of this procedure. We refer to the article by Chesney et al. (2012) for all the details.
We compute the Asset Volatility Vega from stocks (AV VS) and from options (AV VO) separately. The
Asset Volatility Vega for a single share of stock avvS is defined as:
avvS =
∂BS(V,D, r, T, σV )
∂σV
× 0.01, (10)
where BS(V,D, r, T, σV ) is the Black-Scholes value of equity as a call option on the firm’s value (V ), D is
the book value of debt per share, r is the yield on Treasury bonds with time to maturity 7 years, T is the
maturity of long-term debt (set equal to 7.5 years following Guay, 1999), and σV is the volatility of V .
It follows from the Black-Scholes formulation that:
avvS = ϕ(d1(V,D, r, T, σV ))V
√
T (1/100), (11)
where
d1 =
ln(V/D) + (r + σ2V /2)T
σV
√
T
. (12)
To compute AV VS , we multiply avvS by the number of shares held by the CEO.
The Asset Volatility Vega for an option of stock option grant i (avvOi) is defined as:
avvOi =
∂CC
∂σV
× 0.01, (13)
where CC is the value of the stock option as a call on a call option on firm value (compound option). Chesney
36We depart from the procedure by Coles et al. (2013) only in that we use as risk-free interest rate the one provided by
Execucomp.
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et al. (2012) provide a closed form expression for avvOi .
We define AV VO as:
AV VO =
∑
i
niavvOi . (14)
Finally, we define Asset Volatility Vega (AVV) as:
AV V = AV VS +AV VO. (15)
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B Sample Selection
The following table lists the financial institutions included in the sample. For those firms not in SIC codes
6020 (Commercial Banks), 6035 (Savings Institutions, Federally Chartered), or 6036 (Savings Institutions,
Not Federally Chartered), Column FFIEC Inst. Type reports the institution type in year 2006, according
to the firm’s history at the FFIEC’s National Information Center. The institution types present in the
sample are FHC (Financial Holding Company), FSB (Federal Savings Bank), and S&LHC (Savings and
Loans Holding Company). The Primary Dealer column displays a 1 if the firm is listed as a primary dealer
in 2006 by the New York Fed.
Number Company Name SIC SIC - Description
FFIEC Primary
Inst. Type Dealer
1 AMERICAN EXPRESS CO 6199 FINANCE SERVICES S&LHC
2 AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS S&LHC
3 ANCHOR BANCORP WISCONSIN INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
4 ASSOCIATED BANCCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
5 ASTORIA FINANCIAL CORP 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
6 BANCORPSOUTH INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
7 BANK MUTUAL CORP 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
8 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
9 BANK OF HAWAII CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
10 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
11 BANK OF THE OZARKS INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
12 BANKUNITED FINANCIAL CORP 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
13 BB&T CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
14 BBCN BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
15 BBX CAPITAL CORP 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
16 BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS 1
17 BOSTON PRIVATE FINL HOLDINGS 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
18 BROOKLINE BANCORP INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
19 CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 6141 PERSONAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONS FHC
20 CASCADE BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
21 CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
22 CENTRAL PACIFIC FINANCIAL CP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
23 CHITTENDEN CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
24 CITIGROUP INC 6199 FINANCE SERVICES FHC 1
25 CITY HOLDING CO 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
26 CITY NATIONAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
27 COLONIAL BANCGROUP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
28 COLUMBIA BANKING SYSTEM INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
29 COMERICA INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
30 COMMERCE BANCORP INC/NJ 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
31 COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
32 COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
33 COMPASS BANCSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
34 CORUS BANKSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
35 COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP 6162 MORTGAGE BANKERS & LOAN CORR FHC 1
36 CULLEN/FROST BANKERS INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
37 DIME COMMUNITY BANCSHARES 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
38 DOWNEY FINANCIAL CORP 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
39 E TRADE FINANCIAL CORP 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS S&LHC
40 EAST WEST BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
41 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
42 FIRST BANCORP P R 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
43 FIRST COMMONWLTH FINL CP/PA 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
44 FIRST FINL BANCORP INC/OH 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
45 FIRST FINL BANKSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
46 FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
47 FIRST INDIANA CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
48 FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
49 FIRST NIAGARA FINANCIAL GRP 6036 SAVINGS INSTN, NOT FED CHART
50 FIRST REPUBLIC BANK 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
51 FIRSTFED FINANCIAL CORP/CA 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
52 FIRSTMERIT CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
53 FLAGSTAR BANCORP INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
54 FRANKLIN BANK CORP 6036 SAVINGS INSTN, NOT FED CHART
55 FRONTIER FINANCIAL CORP/WA 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
56 FULTON FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
57 GLACIER BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
58 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS 1
59 GREATER BAY BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
60 GUARANTY FINANCIAL GROUP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
61 HANMI FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
62 HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
63 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
64 INDEPENDENT BANK CORP/MI 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
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65 INDYMAC BANCORP INC 6162 MORTGAGE BANKERS & LOAN CORR FSB
66 INVESTORS FINANCIAL SVCS CP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
67 IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
68 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS 1
69 KEYCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
70 LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS S&LHC 1
71 M & T BANK CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
72 MAF BANCORP INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
73 MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
74 MELLON FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
75 MERCANTILE BANKSHARES CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
76 MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS 1
77 MORGAN STANLEY 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS S&LHC 1
78 N B T BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
79 NATIONAL CITY CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
80 NATIONAL PENN BANCSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
81 NEW YORK CMNTY BANCORP INC 6036 SAVINGS INSTN, NOT FED CHART
82 NORTHERN TRUST CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
83 OLD NATIONAL BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
84 PACWEST BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
85 PEOPLE’S UNITED FINL INC 6036 SAVINGS INSTN, NOT FED CHART
86 PINNACLE FINL PARTNERS INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
87 PNC FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
88 POPULAR INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
89 PRIVATEBANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
90 PROSPERITY BANCSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
91 PROVIDENT BANKSHARES CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
92 RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL CORP 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS S&LHC
93 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
94 S & T BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
95 SANTANDER HOLDINGS USA INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
96 SCHWAB (CHARLES) CORP 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS FHC
97 SIMMONS FIRST NATL CP CL A 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
98 SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
99 STATE STREET CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
100 STERLING BANCORP/NY 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
101 STERLING BANCSHARES INC/TX 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
102 STERLING FINANCIAL CORP/WA 6036 SAVINGS INSTN, NOT FED CHART
103 SUNTRUST BANKS INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
104 SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
105 SVB FINANCIAL GROUP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
106 SWS GROUP INC 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS S&LHC
107 SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
108 TCF FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
109 TD BANKNORTH INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
110 TOMPKINS FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
111 TRUSTCO BANK CORP/NY 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
112 U S BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
113 UCBH HOLDINGS INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
114 UMB FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
115 UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
116 UNIONBANCAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
117 UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
118 UNITED COMMUNITY BANKS INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
119 WACHOVIA CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
120 WASHINGTON FEDERAL INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
121 WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
122 WEBSTER FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
123 WELLS FARGO & CO 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
124 WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
125 WHITNEY HOLDING CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
126 WILMINGTON TRUST CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
127 WILSHIRE BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
128 WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
129 ZIONS BANCORPORATION 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
C Failed Firms
The following table lists the institutions that we identify as failed in the period 2007–2010. Columns Year and
Month represent the last year and month, respectively, for which there is information for the corresponding
firm in CRSP. The columns Step 1–Step 4 refer to the four steps of the procedure to identify firm failure.
A one in any of these columns indicates that the firm was identified as failed in that step. The four steps,
described in Section 2, are: 1) bank subsidiary closure (as identified by the FDIC); 2) merger discount; 3)
PROQUEST keyword search; 4) internet search.
Company Name Year Month Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC 2008 5 1
COLONIAL BANCGROUP 2009 7 1
CORUS BANKSHARES INC 2009 8 1
COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP 2008 6 1
DOWNEY FINANCIAL CORP 2008 10 1
FIRSTFED FINANCIAL CORP 2009 2 1
FRANKLIN BANKCORP 2008 10 1
FRONTIER FINANCIAL CORP/WA 2010 4 1
INDYMAC BANCORP INC 2008 6 1
IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP 2009 8 1
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC 2008 8 1
MELLON FINANCIAL CORP 2007 6 1
MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC 2008 12 1
NATIONAL CITY CORP 2008 12 1
PROVIDENT BANKSHARES CORP 2009 4 1
SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP INC 2010 9 1
UCBH HOLDINGS INC 2009 10 1
WACHOVIA CORP 2008 12 1
WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC 2008 8 1
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(a) Firm A: Low Leverage
(b) Firm B: High Leverage
Figure 1: Leverage and risk-taking incentives. The figures depict the relation between the value
of the firm (X) and the payoff (P ) to an equity holder for two different firms (A and B), which differ
only in the face value of their debt (D). Firm B in Panel (b) has a higher face value of debt than firm
A in Panel (a) (DB > DA) and a higher leverage (
DB
X0
> DAX0 ). We assume that firms are liquidated at
debt maturity after the debt is repaid, so P can be understood as shareholders’ liquidating dividend. In
both figures, the thick line represents the payoff to equity holders at debt maturity (P ) as a function of
the value of the firm (X). The current firm value for either firm is X0 and either firm may undertake
one of two projects, safe (s) or risky (r). The value of the firm at debt maturity is assumed to be either
X0 − k, with probability 1/2, or X0 + k, with probability 1/2, where k = s for project s, k = r for project
r, and r > s. Thus, the distribution of firm value under project r is a mean-preserving spread of the
distribution under project r. P0 = X0 − D denotes the value of the firm’s equity if firm value were X0 at
debt maturity. For firm A in Panel (a) the expected equity value upon liquidation is the same for both
projects: Es(P ) =
1
2 (P0 − s) + 12 (P0 + s) = P0 = 12 (P0 − r) + 12 (P0 + r) = Er(P ). For firm B in Panel (b),
equity value is zero if the project returns are negative. Therefore: Es(P ) =
1
2 (P0 + s) <
1
2 (P0 + r) = Er(P ).
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